SECOND
DIVISION
|
MERCEDES MORALIDAD,
Petitioner, - versus - SPS. DIOSDADO
PERNES and ARLENE PERNES,
Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 152809 Present: PUNO, J.,
Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: August 3, 2006 |
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
GARCIA,
J.:
Under consideration
is this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
to nullify and set aside the following issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 61610, to wit:
1.
Decision dated September 27, 2001,[1]
affirming an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City
which reversed that of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Davao City,
Branch 1, in an action for unlawful detainer thereat commenced by the petitioner
against the herein respondents; and
2.
Resolution dated
At the heart of this
controversy is a parcel of land located in
In her younger days, petitioner taught in
During those years, she would come home
to the
Back in the
Petitioner acquired
the lot property initially for the purpose of letting Arlene move from Mandug to
I, MERCEDES VIŃA MORALIDAD, of legal
age, single, having been born on the 29th day of January, 1923, now
actually residing at 8021 Lindbergh Boulevard, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
U.S.A., wishes to convey my honest intention regarding my properties situated
at Palm Village Subdivision, Bajada, Davao City, 9501, … and hereby declare:
1. That it is my desire that Mr. and Mrs. Diosdado M. Pernes may build their house therein and stay as long as they like;
2. That anybody of my kins who wishes to stay on the aforementioned real property should maintain an atmosphere of cooperation, live in harmony and must avoid bickering with one another;
3. That anyone of my kins may enjoy the privilege to stay therein and may avail the use thereof. Provided, however, that the same is not inimical to the purpose thereof;
4. That anyone of my kins who cannot conform with the wishes of the undersigned may exercise the freedom to look for his own;
5.
That any proceeds or income derived from the
aforementioned properties shall be allotted to my nearest kins who have less in
life in greater percentage and lesser percentage to those who are better of in
standing.
xxx xxx xxx
Following her
retirement in 1993, petitioner came back to the
Other ugly
incidents interspersed with violent confrontations meanwhile transpired, with
the petitioner narrating that, at one occasion in July 1998, she sustained cuts
and wounds when Arlene pulled her hair, hit her on the face, neck and back,
while her husband Diosdado held her, twisting her arms in the process.
Relations having deteriorated from worse to
worst, petitioner, on
Then, on
In their defense, the respondents
alleged having entered the property in question, building their house thereon and
maintaining the same as their residence with petitioner’s full knowledge and
express consent. To prove their point, they invited attention to her written
declaration of
The MTCC, resolving
the ejectment suit in petitioner’s favor, declared that the respondent spouses,
although builders in good faith vis-ŕ-vis
the house they built on her property, cannot invoke their bona fides as a valid excuse for not complying with the demand to
vacate. To the MTCC, respondents’ continued
possession of the premises turned unlawful upon their receipt of the demand to
vacate, such possession being merely at petitioner’s tolerance, and sans any rental. Accordingly, in its decision dated
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of herein plaintiff and against the defendants, as follows:
a) Directing the defendants, their agents and other persons acting on their behalf to vacate the premises and to yield peaceful possession thereof to plaintiff;
b)
Ordering defendants to pay P2,000.00 a month
from the filing of this complaint until they vacate premises;
c)
Sentencing defendants to pay the sum of P120,000.00[5] as
attorney’s fees and to pay the cost of suit.
Defendants counterclaim are hereby
dismissed except with respect to the claim for reimbursement of necessary and
useful expenses which should be litigated in an ordinary civil actions. (sic)
Dissatisfied, the respondent
spouses appealed to the RTC of Davao City.
In the meantime, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. The motion was initially granted by the RTC in its Order of February 29, 2000, but the
Order was later withdrawn and vacated by its subsequent Order dated May 9, 2000[6] on
the ground that immediate execution of the appealed decision was not the
prudent course of action to take, considering that the house the respondents constructed
on the subject property might even be more valuable than the land site.
Eventually, in a decision[7]
dated
Since
the defendants-appellees [respondents] are admittedly possessors of the
property by permission from plaintiff [petitioner], and builders in good faith,
they have the right to retain possession of the property subject of this case
until they have been reimbursed the cost of the improvements they have
introduced on the property.
Indeed,
this is a substantive right given to the defendants by law, and this right is superior to the
procedural right to [sic] plaintiff to
immediately ask for their removal by a writ of execution by virtue of a
decision which as we have shown is erroneous, and therefore invalid. (Words in
brackets supplied),
and accordingly dismissed petitioner’s appeal, as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and declared invalid. Consequently, the motion for execution pending appeal is likewise denied.
Counter-claims of moral and exemplary damages claimed by defendants are likewise dismissed. However, attorney’s fees in the amount of fifteen thousand pesos is hereby awarded in favor of defendants-appellants, and against plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Therefrom,
petitioner went to the CA in CA-G.R. SP
No. 61610.
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant petition for review is hereby denied for lack of merit. Accordingly, the petitioner’s complaint for
Unlawful Detainer is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
With the CA’s denial of her motion for reconsideration
in its Resolution of
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING
THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE FOR BEING PREMATURE WHICH DECISION IS NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING
ARTICLES 448 AND 546 AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE CODE ON USUFRUCT INSTEAD OF
ARTICLE 1678 OF THE CIVIL CODE.
The Court rules
for the petitioner.
The Court is inclined to agree with the
CA that what was constituted between the parties herein is one of usufruct over
a piece of land, with the petitioner being the owner of the property upon whom
the naked title thereto remained and the respondents being two (2) among other
unnamed usufructuaries who were simply referred to as petitioner’s kin. The
Court, however, cannot go along with the CA’s holding that the action for
unlawful detainer must be dismissed on ground of prematurity.
Usufruct is
defined under Article 562 of the Civil Code in the following wise:
ART. 562. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides.
Usufruct, in
essence, is nothing else but simply allowing one to enjoy another’s property.[9] It
is also defined as the right to enjoy the property of another temporarily,
including both the jus utendi and the
jus fruendi,[10]
with the owner retaining the jus
disponendi or the power to alienate the same.[11]
It is undisputed
that petitioner, in a document dated
However, determinative
of the outcome of the ejectment case is the resolution of the next issue, i.e., whether the existing usufruct may
be deemed to have been extinguished or terminated. If the question is resolved
in the affirmative, then the respondents’ right to possession, proceeding as it
did from their right of usufruct, likewise ceased. In that case, petitioner’s
action for ejectment in the unlawful detainer case could proceed and should
prosper.
The CA disposed of
this issue in this wise:
xxx Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides xxx
xxx xxx xxx
From the foregoing provision, it becomes apparent that for an action for unlawful detainer to prosper, the plaintiff [petitioner] needs to prove that defendants’ [respondents’] right to possess already expired and terminated. Now, has respondents’ right to possess the subject portion of petitioner’s property expired or terminated? Let us therefore examine respondents’ basis for occupying the same.
It
is undisputed that petitioner expressly authorized respondents o occupy portion
of her property on which their house may be built. Thus – “it is my desire that Mr. and Mrs.
Diosdado M. Pernes may build their house therein and stay as long as they
like.” From this statement, it seems
that petitioner had given the respondents the usufructuary rights over the
portion that may be occupied by the house that the latter would build, the
duration of which being dependent on how long respondents would like to occupy
the property. While petitioner had
already demanded from the respondents the surrender of the premises, this Court
is of the opinion that the usufructuary rights of respondents had not been terminated
by the said demand considering the clear statement of petitioner that she is
allowing respondents to occupy portion of her land as long as the latter want
to. Considering that respondents still
want to occupy the premises, petitioner clearly cannot eject respondents.[12]
We disagree with
the CA’s conclusion of law on the matter.
The term or period of the usufruct originally specified provides only
one of the bases for the right of a usufructuary to hold and retain possession
of the thing given in usufruct. There are other modes or instances whereby the
usufruct shall be considered terminated or extinguished. For
sure, the Civil Code enumerates such other modes of extinguishment:
ART. 603. Usufruct is extinguished:
(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly appears;
(2) By expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or by the fulfillment of any resolutory condition provided in the title creating the usufruct;
(3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person;
(4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;
(5) By the total loss of the thing in usufruct;
(6) By the termination of the right of the person constituting the usufruct;
(7) By prescription. (Emphasis supplied.)
The document
executed by the petitioner dated
From the pleadings submitted by the
parties, it is indubitable that there were indeed facts and circumstances
whereby the subject usufruct may be deemed terminated or extinguished by the occurrence
of the resolutory conditions provided for in the title creating the usufruct, namely,
the document adverted to which the petitioner executed on July 21, 1986.
As aptly pointed
out by the petitioner in her Memorandum, respondents’ own evidence before the
MTCC indicated that the relations between the parties “have deteriorated to
almost an irretrievable level.”[13] There is no doubt then that what impelled petitioner
to file complaints before the local barangay
lupon, the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, and this instant complaint
for unlawful detainer before the MTCC is that she could not live peacefully and
harmoniously with the Pernes family and vice
versa.
Thus, the Court
rules that the continuing animosity between the petitioner and the Pernes
family and the violence and humiliation she was made to endure, despite her
advanced age and frail condition, are enough factual bases to consider the
usufruct as having been terminated.
To reiterate, the relationship between
the petitioner and respondents respecting the property in question is one of
owner and usufructuary. Accordingly, respondents’ claim for reimbursement of
the improvements they introduced on the property during the effectivity of the usufruct
should be governed by applicable statutory provisions and principles on
usufruct. In this regard, we cite with approval what Justice Edgardo Paras wrote
on the matter:
If
the builder is a usufructuary, his rights will be governed by Arts. 579 and
580. In case like this, the terms of
the contract and the pertinent provisions of law should govern (3
By express
provision of law, respondents, as usufructuary, do not have the right to
reimbursement for the improvements they may have introduced on the property. We
quote Articles 579 and 580 of the Civil Code:
Art. 579. The usufructuary may make on the property held in usufruct such useful improvements or expenses for mere pleasure as he may deem proper, provided he does not alter its form or substance; but he shall have no right to be indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove such improvements, should it be possible to do so without damage to the property. (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 580. The usufructuary may set off the improvements
he may have made on the property against any damage to the same.
Given the
foregoing perspective, respondents will have to be ordered to vacate the
premises without any right of reimbursement. If the rule on reimbursement or
indemnity were otherwise, then the usufructuary might, as an author pointed
out, improve the owner out of his property.[15] The respondents may, however, remove or
destroy the improvements they may have introduced thereon without damaging the petitioner’s
property.
Out of the
generosity of her heart, the petitioner has allowed the respondent spouses to
use and enjoy the fruits of her property for quite a long period of time. They
opted, however, to repay a noble gesture with unkindness. At the end of the
day, therefore, they really cannot begrudge their aunt for putting an end to
their right of usufruct. The disposition herein arrived is not only legal and called
for by the law and facts of the case. It is also right.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the CA are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the decision
of the MTCC is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION that all of respondents’ counterclaims are dismissed, including their
claims for reimbursement of useful and necessary expenses.
No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO S .PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando with then Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner (now ret.) and Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, concurring; Rollo, pp. 51-58.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] Later changed to P20,000.00
as per Order dated
[6] Rollo, p. 44.
[7]
[8]
[9] Hemedes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107132,
[10] Eleizegui
vs. Manila Lawn Tennis Club, 2 Phil. 309 (1909); cited in De Leon & De Leon, Jr., Comments & Cases
on Property, 2003 ed., p. 397.
[11] Art. 581, Civil Code.
[12] Rollo, pp. 56-57.
[13]
[14] Paras, Civil Code of the
[15] De Leon & De Leon, Jr., Comments & Cases on Property, 2003 ed., p. 417.